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The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) is very
pleased to have sponsored the study, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997. The study
provides a comprehensive analysis of fraudulent financial reporting occurrences investigated by
the SEC since the issuance of the 1987 Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting (the "Treadway Commission" Report).
We believe the research results will be extremely useful to investors, regulators, stock
exchanges, boards of directors, and external auditors. For the first time, we have a clear
understanding of the who, why, where and how of financial reporting fraud. This knowledge,
properly applied, should help to further reduce the frequency and severity of the fraud problem in
the United States.
Some of the more critical insights of the study are:
•
•

The companies committing fraud generally were small, and most were not listed on the
New York or American Stock Exchanges.
The frauds went to the very top of the organizations. In 72 percent of the cases, the CEO
appeared to be associated with the fraud.

•

•
•

The audit committees and boards of the fraud companies appeared to be weak. Most audit
committees rarely met, and the companies' boards of directors were dominated by
insiders and others with significant ties to the company.
A significant portion of the companies was owned by the founders and board members.
Severe consequences resulted when companies committed fraud, including bankruptcy,
significant changes in ownership, and delisting by national exchanges.

The study results highlight the need for an effective control environment, or "tone at the top."
The risk of fraud is much higher in small companies. A strong CEO, with significant share
ownership in a small organization, needs an experienced, independent board to insure
objectivity.
COSO's mission is to improve the quality of financial reporting through internal controls,
governance, and ethics. This study validates the need for continued focus on all three areas. We
believe the study will provide a platform for those responsible for financial reporting to improve
their effectiveness.
John J. Flaherty
COSO Chairman
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I. Executive Summary and Introduction

Fraudulent financial reporting can have significant consequences for the organization and for
public confidence in capital markets. Periodic high profile cases of fraudulent financial reporting
raise concerns about the credibility of the U.S. financial reporting process and call into question
the roles of auditors, regulators, and analysts in financial reporting.

The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) sponsored
this research project to provide an extensive updated analysis of financial statement fraud
occurrences. While the work of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting in
the mid-1980s identified numerous causal factors believed to contribute to financial statement
fraud, little empirical evidence exists about factors related to instances of fraud since the release
of the 1987 report (NCFFR, 1987). Thus, COSO commissioned this research project to provide
COSO, and others, with information that can be used to guide future efforts to combat the
problem of financial statement fraud and to provide a better understanding of financial statement
fraud cases.
This research has three specific objectives:
•

•
•

To identify instances of alleged fraudulent financial reporting by registrants of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) first described by the SEC in an Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) issued during the period 1987-1997.
To examine certain key company and management characteristics for a sample of these
companies involved in instances of financial statement fraud.
To provide a basis for recommendations to improve the corporate financial reporting
environment in the U.S.

We analyzed instances of fraudulent financial reporting alleged by the SEC in AAERs issued
during the 11 year period between January 1987 and December 1997. The AAERs, which
contain summaries of enforcement actions by the SEC against public companies, represent one
of the most comprehensive sources of alleged cases of financial statement fraud in the United
States. We focused on AAERs that involved an alleged violation of Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act or Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act given that these represent
the primary antifraud provisions related to financial statement reporting. Our focus was on cases
clearly involving financial statement fraud. We excluded from our analysis restatements of
financial statements due to errors or earnings management activities that did not result in a
violation of the federal antifraud statutes.
Our search identified nearly 300 companies involved in alleged instances of fraudulent financial
reporting during the 11 year period. From this list of companies, we randomly selected
approximately 200 companies to serve as the final sample that we examined in detail. Findings
reported in this study are based on information we obtained from our reading of (a) AAERs
related to each of the sample fraud companies, (b) selected Form 10-Ks filed before and during
the period the alleged financial statement fraud occurred, (c) proxy statements issued during the
alleged fraud period, and (d) business press articles about the sample companies after the fraud
was disclosed.
Summary of Findings
Several key findings can be generalized from this detailed analysis of our sample of
approximately 200 financial statement fraud cases. We have grouped these findings into five
categories describing the nature of the companies involved, the nature of the control

environment, the nature of the frauds, issues related to the external auditor, and the consequences
to the company and the individuals allegedly involved.
Nature of Companies Involved
•

•

Relative to public registrants, companies committing financial statement fraud were
relatively small. The typical size of most of the sample companies ranged well below
$100 million in total assets in the year preceding the fraud period. Most companies (78
percent of the sample) were not listed on the New York or American Stock Exchanges.
Some companies committing the fraud were experiencing net losses or were in close
to break-even positions in periods before the fraud. Pressures of financial strain or
distress may have provided incentives for fraudulent activities for some fraud companies.
The lowest quartile of companies indicate that they were in a net loss position, and the
median company had net income of only $175,000 in the year preceding the first year of
the fraud period. Some companies were experiencing downward trends in net income in
periods preceding the first fraud period, while other companies were experiencing
upward trends in net income. Thus, the subsequent frauds may have been designed to
reverse downward spirals for some companies and to preserve upward trends for other
companies.

Nature of the Control Environment (Top Management and the Board)
•

•

•

•

Top senior executives were frequently involved. In 72 percent of the cases, the AAERs
named the chief executive officer (CEO), and in 43 percent the chief financial officer
(CFO) was associated with the financial statement fraud. When considered together, in 83
percent of the cases, the AAERs named either or both the CEO or CFO as being
associated with the financial statement fraud. Other individuals named in several AAERs
include controllers, chief operating officers, other senior vice presidents, and board
members.
Most audit committees only met about once a year or the company had no audit
committee. Audit committees of the fraud companies generally met only once per year.
Twenty-five percent of the companies did not have an audit committee. Most audit
committee members (65 percent) did not appear to be certified in accounting or have
current or prior work experience in key accounting or finance positions.
Boards of directors were dominated by insiders and "grey" directors with
significant equity ownership and apparently little experience serving as directors of
other companies. Approximately 60 percent of the directors were insiders or "grey"
directors (i.e., outsiders with special ties to the company or management). Collectively,
the directors and officers owned nearly 1/3 of the companies' stock, with the
CEO/President personally owning about 17 percent. Nearly 40 percent of the boards had
not one director who served as an outside or grey director on another company's board.
Family relationships among directors and / or officers were fairly common, as were
individuals who apparently had significant power. In nearly 40 percent of the
companies, the proxy provided evidence of family relationships among the directors and /
or officers. The founder and current CEO were the same person or the original CEO /
President was still in place in nearly half of the companies. In over 20 percent of the

companies, there was evidence of officers holding incompatible job functions (e.g., CEO
and CFO).
Nature of the Frauds
•

•

•

Cumulative amounts of frauds were relatively large in light of the relatively small
sizes of the companies involved. The average financial statement misstatement or
misappropriation of assets was $25 million and the median was $4.1 million. While the
average company had assets totaling $533 million, the median company had total assets
of only $16 million.
Most frauds were not isolated to a single fiscal period. Most frauds overlapped at least
two fiscal periods, frequently involving both quarterly and annual financial statements.
The average fraud period extended over 23.7 months, with the median fraud period
extending 21 months. Only 14 percent of the sample companies engaged in a fraud
involving fewer than twelve months.
Typical financial statement fraud techniques involved the overstatement of revenues
and assets. Over half the frauds involved overstating revenues by recording revenues
prematurely or fictitiously. Many of those revenue frauds only affected transactions
recorded right at period end (i.e., quarter end or year end). About half the frauds also
involved overstating assets by understating allowances for receivables, overstating the
value of inventory, property, plant and equipment and other tangible assets, and recording
assets that did not exist.

Issues Related to the External Auditor
•

•

•

•

All sizes of audit firms were associated with companies committing financial
statement frauds. Fifty-six percent of the sample fraud companies were audited by a Big
Eight/Six auditor during the fraud period, and 44 percent were audited by non-Big
Eight/Six auditors.
All types of audit reports were issued during the fraud period. A majority of the audit
reports (55 percent) issued in the last year of the fraud period contained unqualified
opinions. The remaining 45 percent of the audit reports issued in the last year of the fraud
departed from the standard unqualified auditor's report because they addressed issues
related to the auditor's substantial doubt about going concern, litigation and other
uncertainties, changes in accounting principles, and changes in auditors between fiscal
years comparatively reported. Three percent of the audit reports were qualified due to a
GAAP departure during the fraud period.
Financial statement fraud occasionally implicated the external auditor. Auditors
were explicitly named in the AAERs for 56 of the 195 fraud cases (29 percent) where
AAERs explicitly named individuals. They were named for either alleged involvement in
the fraud (30 of 56 cases) or for negligent auditing (26 of 56 cases). Most of the auditors
explicitly named in an AAER (46 of 56) were non-Big Eight/Six auditors.
Some companies changed auditors during the fraud period. Just over 25 percent of
the companies changed auditors during the time-frame beginning with the last clean
financial statement period and ending with the last fraud financial statement period. A
majority of the auditor changes occurred during the fraud period (e.g., two auditors were

associated with the fraud period) and a majority involved changes from one non-Big
Eight/Six auditor to another non-Big Eight/Six auditor.
Consequences for the Company and Individuals Involved
•

•

Severe consequences awaited companies committing fraud. Consequences of financial
statement fraud to the company often include bankruptcy, significant changes in
ownership, and delisting by national exchanges, in addition to financial penalties
imposed. A large number of the sample firms (over 50 percent) were bankrupt/defunct or
experienced a significant change in ownership following disclosure of the fraud. Twentyone percent of the companies were delisted by a national stock exchange.
Consequences associated with financial statement fraud were severe for individuals
allegedly involved. Individual senior executives were subject to class action legal suits
and SEC actions that resulted in financial penalties to the executives personally. A
significant number of individuals were terminated or forced to resign from their executive
positions. However, relatively few individuals explicitly admitted guilt or eventually
served prison sentences.
Summary of Implications

The research team analyzed the results to identify implications that might be relevant to senior
managers, board of director and audit committee members, and internal and external auditors.
The implications reflect the judgment and opinions of the research team, developed from the
extensive review of information related to the cases involved. Hopefully the presentation of these
implications will lead to the consideration of changes that can promote higher quality financial
reporting. The following implications are noted:
Implications Related to the Nature of the Companies Involved
•

•

•

The relatively small size of fraud companies suggests that the inability or even
unwillingness to implement cost-effective internal controls may be a factor affecting the
likelihood of financial statement fraud (e.g., override of controls is easier). Smaller
companies may be unable or unwilling to employ senior executives with sufficient
financial reporting knowledge and experience. Boards, audit committees, and auditors
need to challenge management to ensure that a baseline level of internal control is
present.
The national stock exchanges and regulators should evaluate the tradeoffs of designing
policies that might exempt small companies, given the relatively small size of the
companies involved in financial statement fraud. A regulatory focus on companies with
market capitalization in excess of $200 million may fail to target companies with greater
risk for financial statement fraud activities.
Given that some of the fraud firms were experiencing financial strain in periods
preceding the fraud, effective monitoring of the organization's going-concern status is
warranted, particularly as auditors consider new clients. In addition, the importance of
effective communications with predecessor auditors is highlighted by the fact that several
observations of auditor changes were noted during the fraud period.

Implications Related to the Nature of the Control Environment (Top Management and the
Board)
•

•

•

•

•

The importance of the organization's control environment cannot be overstated, as
emphasized in COSO's Internal Control - Integrated Framework (COSO, 1992).
Monitoring the pressures faced by senior executives (e.g., pressures from compensation
plans, investment community expectations, etc.) is critical. The involvement of senior
executives who are knowledgeable of financial reporting requirements, particularly those
unique to publicly-traded companies, may help to educate other senior executives about
financial reporting issues and may help to restrain senior executives from overly
aggressive reporting. In other cases, however, board members and auditors should be
alert for deceptive managers who may use that knowledge to disguise a fraud.
The concentration of fraud among companies with under $50 million in revenues and
with generally weak audit committees highlights the importance of rigorous audit
committee practices even for smaller organizations. In particular, the number of audit
committee meetings per year and the financial expertise of the audit committee members
may deserve closer attention.
It is important to consider whether smaller companies should focus heavily on director
independence and expertise, like large companies are currently being encouraged to do.
In the smaller company setting, due to the centralization of power in a few individuals, it
may be especially important to have a solid monitoring function performed by the board.
An independent audit committee's effectiveness can be hindered by the quality and extent
of information it receives. To perform effective monitoring, the audit committee needs
access to reliable financial and non-financial information, industry and other external
benchmarking data, and other comparative information that is prepared on a consistent
basis. Boards and audit committees should work to obtain from senior management and
other information providers relevant and reliable data to assist them in monitoring the
financial reporting process.
Investors should be aware of the possible complications arising from family relationships
and from individuals (founders, CEO / board chairs, etc.) who hold significant power or
incompatible job functions. Due to the size and nature of the sample companies, the
existence of such relationships and personal factors is to be expected. It is important to
recognize that such conditions present both benefits and risks.

Implications Related to the Nature of the Frauds
•

•

The multi-period aspect of financial statement fraud, often beginning with the
misstatement of interim financial statements, suggests the importance of interim reviews
of quarterly financial statements and the related controls surrounding interim financial
statement preparation, as well as the benefits of continuous auditing strategies.
The nature of misstatements affecting revenues and assets recorded close to or as of the
fiscal period end highlights the importance of effective consideration and testing of
internal control related to transaction cutoff and asset valuation. Based on the assessed
risk related to internal control, the auditor should evaluate the need for substantive testing
procedures to reduce audit risk to an acceptable level and design tests in light of this
consideration. Procedures affecting transaction cut-off, transactions terms, and account

valuation estimation for end-of-period accounts and transactions may be particularly
relevant.
Implications Regarding the Roles of External Auditors
•

•

There is a strong need for the auditor to look beyond the financial statements to
understand risks unique to the client's industry, management's motivation towards
aggressive reporting, and client internal control (particularly the tone at the top), among
other matters. As auditors approach the audit, information from a variety of sources
should be considered to establish an appropriate level of professional skepticism needed
for each engagement.
The auditor should recognize the potential likelihood for greater audit risk when auditing
companies with weak board and audit committee governance.
Overview of Report

The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section II provides a description of the
approach we took to identify the sample cases of fraudulent financial reporting and contains a
summary of the sources we used to gather data related to each sample case. Section III contains a
summary of the results from our detailed analysis of approximately 200 cases of fraudulent
financial reporting.
The detailed analysis of findings from this examination of fraudulent financial reporting
violations produced numerous insights for further consideration. Section IV highlights those
insights that have implications applicable to senior managers, board of director and audit
committee members, and internal and external auditors. Section V provides a historical
perspective on efforts related to financial statement fraud that have occurred since the issuance of
the Treadway Commission's 1987 report (NCFFR, 1987). That section highlights numerous
efforts by a variety of organizations related to the roles of external auditors, management, boards
of directors, and audit committees.
Section VI provides an overview of significant findings from academic research that has been
conducted since the late 1980s. This overview provides a summary of key insights coming from
academic literature that provide additional perspective on the financial statement fraud problem.
We are confident that this report, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-1997, will prove helpful
to parties concerned with corporate financial reporting. We hope it will stimulate greater
awareness of opportunities for improvements in the corporate financial reporting process.
The report may be obtained by calling the AICPA One Stop Shopping toll free number (888777-7077) and requesting product #990036. The cost for each copy is $20.00 for members and
$25.00 for non-members.
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